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Abstract  
This paper examines, in the context of a multiple types of consumers, a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions under which equilibrium and optimum exist, 
and involve mixing types of consumers in jurisdictions. Pricing includes visa 
permits for entry. Following Berglas (1976), we assume anonymous crowding 
and complementarities in production. For a large economy, we prove existence 
of equilibrium and the first and second welfare theorems. Our simultaneous 
optimization approach provides a new technique for showing existence of 
equilibrium in local public good economies with local production and a 
continuum of agents. 
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1 Introduction
Tiebout (1956) claimed that in a model with local public goods and many juris-
dictions (among other conditions), equilibrium will feature sorting of consumers
by type and that the resulting allocation will be e¢ cient. Twenty years later,
Berglas (1976) proposed a frictionless production Tiebout economy, where private
goods are produced within each community by means of its labor inputs, drop-
ping in this way the unnecessary and unrealistic assumption of no restrictions
due to employment opportunities from the Tiebout model. In an anonymous
crowding scenario (the consumers care only about the level of congestion of the
public goods and not about the identities of the other individuals making use of
them), Berglas showed that if individuals di¤er in their productive skills (teach-
ers, accountants, unskilled workers, etc.), the distributions of tastes for public
goods and labor skills are independent, and labor skills in a community are com-
plementary, then individuals may become better o¤ forming mixed communities
rather than sorting into homogeneous communities.
Berglaspurpose was to analyze the formation of mixed communities, its ef-
ciency, and the associated tax structures. However, Berglas (1976) did not
demonstrate existence of equilibrium and his existence conjecture was subject
to Bewleys (1981) criticism. The issue of the existence of equilibrium was also
left aside in the subsequent literature that analyze the formation of mixed com-
munities (see, for example, Bartolome (1990), Benabou (1993), McGuire (1991),
and Schwab and Oates (1991)). Those models su¤er from several shortcom-
ings that prevent the study of the existence of equilibrium. In particular, the
approach through di¤erential techniques is inappropriate when considering the
population and locations as discrete sets. This well known integer problem
was rst analyzed by Pauly (1970) and Wooders (1978), and concisely summa-
rized by Starrett (1988). Proving existence of equilibrium is a fundamental step
that must be done before aiming at any normative and empirical test of the
model. Otherwise, equilibrium may fail to exist, suggesting that the equations
that describe the model are not consistent with each other.
Being inspired by Berglas(1976) work, we propose an alternative general equi-
librium model that incorporates Berglasmain assumptions: anonymous crowd-
ing, di¤erent labor skills among individual types, and labor complementarities
in the production of private goods. Although our model is di¤erent from Berglas
(1976), we recognize his pioneering work on this subject, and for this reason,
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hereinafter refer to our economy as a Berglas economy. The extension of Berglas
(1976) to a jurisdictions economy hinges on a conception of how the world is
articulated: jurisdictions are small in size. Negligible jurisdictions are mod-
eled following the works of Allouch, Conley, and Wooders (2009) (hereinafter,
ACW) and Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer, and Zame (1999) (hereinafter EGSZ).
We consider a world whose population splits into city districts, municipalities,
villages, and counties, and not into countries with a bigsize.1
For the Berglas economy proposed here, our main formal goal is to demon-
strate that heterogeneous Tiebout communities exist and are optimal in equili-
brium. To obtain this result we need to identify the conditions under which 1)
equilibrium exists, 2) the set of equilibria is equivalent to the core, and 3) the
core involves mixing types of consumers in jurisdictions. Our descriptive and
normative analysis of heterogeneous mixed communities is important in the fol-
lowing respects. First, the analysis refutes Bewleys (1981, p. 725, 733) argument
against the possibility of extending Tiebouts analysis to include heterogeneous
communities. Second, only by bringing job opportunities into Tiebouts model
can we properly understand the pricing characteristics of a market of visa per-
mits.2 Third, we demonstrate that Tiebouts theory does not speak against the
empirical evidence that analyzes heterogeneous communities in places that o¤er
both public goods and industries to work with (see, for example, Roback (1982)).
Our proof of existence of equilibrium is novel, di¤erent from the previous core
decentralization approach (see Wooders (1978), Conley and Wooders (1997), and
ACW (2009)) and the non-excess demand approach (see EGSZ (1999)). Here,
we follow a simultaneous optimization approach. For this, we construct a gener-
alized game for our atomless local public goods and production economy, prove
that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies, and then show that such
equilibrium is, in fact, a price taking equilibrium for a Berglas economy. This
proof constitutes by itself a contribution to the clubs / local public goods liter-
ature. For pedagogical reasons, we explain in Section 5 the di¤erence between
these three approaches and also the new subtleties that this third approach has
for these types of economies (local public goods, continuum of consumers, puri-
1Big cities such as London or New York are thought of as conglomerates of jurisdictions,
such as Knightsbridge (London) or Soho (New York). Both are clear examples of jurisdic-
tions with heterogeneous consumers (heterogeneity in their income levels, productive skills and
preferences).
2Some countries, such as the U.K., are considering selling visa permits to enter the country
to work there.
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cation of equilibrium).
The literature on community composition coming after Tiebouts tale has
been extensive. It is well established (Scotchmer and Wooders (1987)) that
communities should be taste-homogenous if crowding types are exogenous and
crowding is anonymous. Non-anonymous crowding (consumers have preferences
for the other types of consumers with whom they wish to share a jurisdiction)
allowed Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), ACW (2009), and EGSZ (1999, 2006)
to recover heterogeneity in the community composition. We depart from these
papers in that we show that heterogeneous communities exist and are optimal
in a context of anonymous crowding and exogenous crowding types if a local
collaborative production technology is added into the picture.
To our knowledge, Conley andWooders (2001) and Konishi (2010) are the only
exceptions in the theoretical literature that obtains optimal taste-heterogeneous
jurisdictions in a context of anonymous crowding. However, both models dif-
fer from the present one. On the one hand, Conley and Wooders (2001) obtain
heterogeneity in community composition through di¤erent agentsgenetic endow-
ments and endogenous crowding types (through educational choices). Although
these authors discuss the need to drop Tiebouts assumption of no restriction
due to labor opportunities, their model does not incorporate a private produc-
tion sector associated with a jurisdiction, nor does it touch the point of how
labor complementarities induce agents to sort into heterogeneous communities.
Konishi (2010), on the other hand, addresses the issue of existence of hetero-
geneous clubs in a context of anonymous crowding. However, even if his result
seems similar to ours, the source of heterogeneity is totally di¤erent. There,
mixed clubs result and are e¢ cient if clubs have multiple facilities (e.g., gym and
swimming pool) with economies of scope, whereas in the present paper hetero-
geneous communities arise due to the labor complementarities in the production
of a jurisdiction industry.
Our model captures the group composition problempointed out by Berglas
(1976). In our setting, each jurisdiction o¤ers both public goods and a specic
industry.3 Therefore, wages are both type and jurisdiction specic. This implies
that the jurisdiction-type specic wage rate results in di¤erent wages among
3The comparison between jurisdictions with di¤erent production technologies and supply
of public goods captures the profound debate in the economic policy arena: more versus less
market oriented economies, e.g., Silicon Valley (California, U.S.A.) versus Keilaniemi, the
basement of Nokia (Espoo, Finland), respectively.
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the di¤erent individuals of the jurisdiction. This treatment of production dif-
fers from Wooders (1978), who makes production dependent only on the size of
the jurisdiction. Also, the assumption of a jurisdiction specic industry departs
from Benabou (1993), who models production as a citywide activity (same in-
dustry for several jurisdictions). We introduce no contractual problems into the
model (skills are observable and adverse selection problems are ruled out).4 Our
attention is primarily oriented toward the properties of societal stratication.
Another related paper is Konishi (2008), which models a Tiebout economy
with entrepreneurs, where communities have an associated exogenous wage in
each jurisdiction. In that paper, communities are homogeneously populated as a
consequence of the imposition of a zoning constraint that makes crowding e¤ects
anonymous. In our paper we take the standard assumption of a complete price
system for the set of jurisdiction types (thus, entrepreneurs are absent). We
also depart from Konishi (2008) in that we make the production technology and
wages endogenously dependent on the prole of worker types in a jurisdiction.
This further step is crucial for the study of the di¤erent possible patterns of com-
munity composition. The idea is that if the private production in a jurisdiction
is collaborative (e.g., Leontie¤ or Cobb-Douglas) and pays high wages, then the
individuals will prefer to group into a heterogeneous community, once the pattern
of community composition ts with the labor complementarities required in the
production sector. This result holds true in an anonymous crowding framework.
Our work also bears some relationship to that of EGSZ (2006), where so-
cial interaction externalities are embedded in a general equilibrium model: the
membership pricing of the group formation (inputs and outputs) accommodates
the existing externalities within a rm, such as poor working conditions and un-
congenial co-workers. EGSZ (2006) give many interesting examples, but do not
demonstrate equilibrium existence and core decentralization in this new model
(the authors highlight only some new di¢ culties compared with EGSZs (1999)
proofs). Our model di¤ers from EGSZ (2006) in that we consider a scenario with
anonymous crowding, and therefore, externalities within a community of the
types mentioned above do not enter into consumerspreferences, and therefore,
are not priced. Another di¤erence is that we explicitly consider a production
technology associated with each jurisdiction that exhibits complementarities in
its labor inputs. By assuming that the production technology exhibits constant
returns to scale, we are able to parameterize wages in the prole of propor-
4See Zame (2007) for a rm general equilibrium model with contractual problems.
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tions of consumerstypes. This parameterization is the ultimate determinant of
how the community composition a¤ects agentsutilities. (EGSZ (2006) make
no assumptions about the way in which utility depends on the choice of group
memberships). This is a fundamental element for our model to capture Berglas
group composition problem.
2 Berglasmodel reformulated
Our economy is as follows. Trade of private goods occurs in international markets
(as in Berglas (1976, Section 5), where intercommunity trade is allowed for).
However, to have access to the consumption of the public goods a consumer
must belong to a jurisdiction, and for that the consumer has to acquire a visa
permit (or jurisdiction membership). The visa also allows the consumer to work
in the jurisdiction industry, and thus to obtain a wage.
The set of private goods is L = f1; :::; l; :::; Lg : The corresponding price vector
is p 2 RL+: There is a nite number of indivisible public projects, in the sense of
Mas-Colell (1980). A public project consists of a discrete set of public goods (e.g.,
schools and parks). The set of public projects is denoted byG = f1; :::; g; :::; Gg :
There is also a nite set of production technologies Y = f1; :::; y; :::; Y g. The
characteristics of these production technologies will be specied below.
In what follows, all of Berglas(1976) assumptions start with B. Other as-
sumptions needed to assure existence of equilibrium start with A.
Assumption B1: Each public project g 2 G has an associated cost c(g) 2
RL+ in terms of private goods.
Assumption B1 says that for each public good (recall that there is a nite
number of public goods), there is an associated cost in terms of private goods
(and only in terms of private goods). This is a Leontie¤ type of production
technology, where for each type of public good g 2 G the amount of private
goods inputs is pre-determined. This assumption is also present in earlier works
(see EGSZ (1999) and Konishi (2008)). The next assumption is required in order
to avoid non-convexities associated with the consumerschoice problem.
Assumption A1 (Large economy): The set of consumers is a nonatomic
nite measure space (H;H; ), where H is a -algebra of subsets of H and  is
the associated Lebesgue measure.
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A consumers type is a complete description of his endowments, membership
characteristics, and preferences (each is described below). The set of consumers
types is nite, denoted by  = f1; :::;g. Each consumer h in H has an asso-
ciated type  2 . The set of type  consumers is denoted H() 2 H, and has
associated a positive nite measure (H()) > 0: We refer to a representative
consumer of type  2  by h 2 H():
Endowments: The endowment mapping h ! e(h) is an integrable function,
where e(h) 2 RL+. Endowments are observable. All consumers of the same type
are endowed with the same vector of private goods, i.e., el(h) = el ; for all l
and h:We assume that endowments are uniformly bounded above and that the
aggregate endowment is strictly positive, i.e.,
P

R
H
e(h)d > E; for E 2 RL++:5
Membership characteristics indicate the role of a consumer type in a juris-
diction. In particular, the consumers membership characteristic describes his
productive skills, that is, his ability to carry out a certain type of work in the
jurisdiction industry. Consumers of the same type have the same productive
skills. Productive skills are observable and contractible.
Utility function: Consumers have preferences dened over the consumption
of private goods x 2 RL+; the consumption of the public project g 2 G, and its
associated level of congestion, denoted by n 2 N+ (a natural number). Preferen-
ces are represented by the utility function ~uh(x; g; n): This utility is decreasing
in the level of congestion. If no public project is o¤ered in a jurisdiction, the
congestion is assumed to be irrelevant.6 Also, we assume that consumer hs util-
ity ~uh(; g; n) is continuous, strictly monotonic, and quasiconcave. A standard
assumption in the club / local public goods literature, which is also present in
Berglas (1973), is the following.
Assumption B2: For all h of the same type , ~uh(x; g; n) = ~u(x; g; n).
As pointed out in Section 5, Assumption B2 can be relaxed by allowing con-
sumers of the same type to have di¤erent preferences on the consumption of
private goods.
Jurisdictions and visa permits: A jurisdiction type ! is described by
the membership characteristics of its community and its organizational charac-
5By z 2 RL++ we mean that all coordinates of the vector z are strictly positive real numbers,
whereas by z 2 RL+ we mean that all coordinates of the vector z are non-negative real numbers.
6That is, 8(n; n0) with n 6= n0; ~uh (x; ;; n) = ~uh (x; ;; n0), where ; means that there is no
public project:
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teristics (in EGSZ (2006) terminology). The organization characteristics of a
jurisdiction ! are its o¤er of public project, denoted by g! 2 G; the production
technology (described below) associated with the jurisdiction industry, denoted
by y! 2 Y; and the prole of consumers (n!)2, where n! 2 N denotes the
number of type  consumers in a jurisdiction type !. The public project has
an associated level of congestion n! =
P
2 n

!. Thus, a jurisdiction type is
characterized by a policy package !  (g!; y!;
 
n!

2):
For all our analysis, we assume that consumers care only about the level of
congestion of the public goods and not about the identities of the other individ-
uals making use of the public goods.
Assumption B3 (Anonymous crowding): For every consumer h 2 H and
any pair of jurisdictions ! = (g!; y!; (n!)2) and ~! = (g~!; y~!;
 
n~!

2) with
g! = g~! and
P
 n

! =
P
 n

~!, but n

! 6= n~! for some consumer types  2 , we
have ~uh(x; g!;
P
 n

!) = ~u
h(x; g~!;
P
 n

~!):
The set of possible jurisdiction types is 
 = f1; :::; !; :::;
g : Notice that the
set 
 is nite, since the sets of consumerstypes, public projects, and production
technologies are nite. Without loss of generality, we refer to a type ! jurisdiction
by !: The following assumption guarantees that each jurisdiction is negligible
with respect to the whole economy.
Assumption A2: Each jurisdiction has a nite number of consumers.7
A consequence of imposing assumptions A1 and A2 is that the continuum of
consumers splits into nitely populated jurisdictions,8 and therefore there will
be a continuum of jurisdictions.
By acquiring a visa permit (or membership), a consumer gains access to the
jurisdiction, so that he can consume its public goods and work in the jurisdiction
industry. The visa is consumer-type () and jurisdiction-type (!) specic. We
denote it by m = (; !): The set of visas is denoted by M: A list is a function
 :M! f0; 1; :::g where (; !) represents the number of visas of type (; !):We
7The assumption of nitely populated coalitions in an economy with a continuum of con-
sumers is standard in the literature (see Kaneko and Wooders (1986)).
8Recently, AW (2008, 2009) has dispensed with Assumption A2 by assuming Desirability
of Wealth, so that large political jurisdictions (such as states or countries) become possible
in equilibrium. In the present paper we model small communities as entrepreneurial organiza-
tions, and thus prefer to keep the idea of macroscopically negligible jurisdictions. Negligible
jurisdictions are analogous to Aumanns (1964) pioneering concept of negligible agents.
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write Lists = f :  is a listg:
We dene ! as the proportion of type  consumers in a jurisdiction type !,
that is, ! = (n

!=n!) 2 [0; 1] : We then refer to ! =
 
!

2 as the prole of
proportions of consumer types in jurisdiction !: As explained below, proportions
of consumer types are central in our analysis of societal stratication.
Jurisdictions and consumers: In addition to his endowments, membership
characteristics, and utility function, a consumer h 2 H has an associated con-
sumption set. We dene the consumer hs consumption set Xh  RL+  Lists
as the set of feasible bundles of private goods and visa permits that consumer h
can choose. The consumption set correspondence h ! Xh is assumed to be a
measurable correspondence.
Because consumers choose non-negative numbers of jurisdiction memberships,
we dene the choice function  : H ! Lists: For our jurisdictions economy, we
impose that Xh is such that:
a) if (xh ; h) 2 Xh and x^h  xh , then (x^h ; h) 2 Xh :
b) each consumer chooses at most one membership, i.e.,
P
m2M 
h(m)  1:
Condition b) is convenient in order to maintain the idea of a jurisdiction as the
place to live and work, as we can examine Berglas(1976) group composition
problemin a general equilibrium framework of jurisdictions formation. The set
Lists(h) = fh 2 Lists :
P
m 
h(m)  1, 9xh s.t. (xh ; h) 2 Xhg can be
seen as the consumer hs restricted consumption set of visa permits compatible
with his private consumption.
The aggregate membership-(; !) vector is given by ^(; !) =
R
H()
h(; !)d:
We now impose a measurement requirement on ^ 2 RM, which requires consis-
tent matching of consumers in terms of the aggregate of choices.9 We say that
the aggregate membership vector ^ 2 RM is consistent if for every jurisdiction
type ! 2 
 there is a real number (!) such that ^(; !) = (!)n!; 8 2 :
Here, (!) is read as the numberof type ! jurisdictions. The choice function
 : H ! Lists is consistent for ~H = [ ~H()  H if the corresponding vector
^ is consistent. We write Cons  f^ 2 RM : ^ is consistentg: Observe also
that under this condition the proportions that hold in a type ! jurisdiction are
maintained once we integrate over the existing jurisdictions of this type, that is,
^(;!)
^(!)
= n

!
n!
= !;8 2 : Also, the relative proportions of consumer types in a
9See also Kaneko and Wooders (1986) and EGSZ (1999, 2006).
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jurisdiction ! are maintained.
A visa permitm = (; !) gives access to the consumption of the public project
g! 2 G (with an associated level of congestion n): Thus, we can write con-
sumer hs utility function as a function of the consumption of private goods
and jurisdiction membership, i.e., uh : Xh ! R. That is, uh  x; h(m) 
~uh(x; g!; n!); for m = (; g!; y!; (n!)2):
10 The utility mapping (h; x; ) !
uh(x; ) is a jointly measurable function of all its arguments.
Jurisdiction industry: Following Berglas (1976), the production of private
goods requires only labor (a body of consumers of di¤erent types engaged in the
production activity).11 In particular, the production correspondence y 2 Y maps
labor inputs
 


2 2 R+ into private goods (outputs), i.e., y :
 


2  R
L
+:
Individuals with the same productive skills are seen as similar labor units.
Assumption A3: (i) y(()2) is convex and compact for all y 2 Y,
(ii) 0 2 y(()2) (i.e., no set of consumers is forced to produce), (iii) y is
di¤erentiable in labor inputs ()2, and (iv) every y 2 Y exhibits a constant
returns to scale (CRS) technology.12
For each jurisdiction type ! there is a specic private production technology
y! 2 Y satisfying Assumption A3.
We consider an economy where the amount of labor contracts available in the
jurisdiction industries coincides with the individualsdemand for jurisdictions (in
equilibrium). Thus, if in equilibrium a jurisdiction has a prole
 
n!

2, then
there will be n! units of labor of type  available in this jurisdiction industry,
and therefore, the production of a type ! jurisdiction evaluated at the prole
(n!)2 will be y!((n

!)2).
The wage that a type  consumer obtains in a type ! jurisdiction is denoted by
! 2 R+. In equilibrium, the consumers wage equals his marginal productivity
in the jurisdiction industry (in our generalized game this is assured by allowing
a ctitious auctioneer to mimic the competitive market solution of a production
economy). Wages are thus a funciton of prices p:
10The optimization problem with this new form of utility corresponds to Stages 1 and 2 of
the generalized game in Section 6.
11A model where production is a function of both labor inputs and physical capita would
give us no further insights on the group composition problem, and is thus omited.
12See Freeman (1996) and Mookherjee and Ray (2010) for the consequences on inequality of
considering a di¤erent production technology.
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Notice that a CRS production technology implies that wages are homoge-
neous of degree zero in the labor inputs, which in turn implies that the marginal
productivity depends on the proportions of consumer types in the jurisdiction.
Therefore, in our context, it is legitimate to write the wages as a function of the
prole of proportions, i.e., !(p; !);8 2 : This parameterization is the nal
justication of assuming a nite number of consumer types, as the community
composition can be easily described in terms of proportions.
Pricing: Consumers must pay personalized lump-sum taxes in order to cover
the cost of providing the public project g! o¤ered by a jurisdiction !: In par-
ticular, a type  consumer will pay a transfer t! in jurisdiction ! and a poll
fee p  !, with ! 2 RL+: The poll fees, common to all consumers in the juris-
diction, cover the costs pc(g!) of providing the public project g!. The trans-
fers t! 2 R can be positive, negative, or zero, as transfers internalize the ex-
ternalities among the consumers in the jurisdiction, given their tastes for the
public goods. Consumerstypes are observable and thus all consumers of the
same type  in the same jurisdiction type ! pay the same transfer t!. We say
that t! 2 R is a pure transfer system in jurisdiction ! if t! 2 Trans; where
Trans = ft! 2 R :
P
 t

!^(; !) = 0; 8^ 2 Consg:
The consumers budget constraint associated with his choice of jurisdiction
membership h(; !) is
pxh + t! + p!  ! + pe (BCh(!))
The budget constraint BCh(!) says that the sum of the cost of the commodities
purchased pxh and the tax t! + p! required to nance the cost of the public
goods of the jurisdiction must be less than or equal to the type-and-jurisdiction-
specic-wage ! that the consumer obtains by working in the jurisdiction indus-
try, and the income obtained from selling the consumers endowments of private
goods.
Consumers of a given type can be required to satisfy some capital provision in
order to acquire a certain jurisdiction membership. Let us think of this commo-
dity as land and denote it by ~l 2 L. Land can be acquired in the market by
any agent, but only those consumers with this land requirement have the oblig-
ation to accommodate it in their consumption bundles. That is, for a consumer
h~, with (x
h~ ; h~(~; !)) 2 Xh~ , if h~(~; !) = 1 for a jurisdiction membership
m = (~; !) that requires providing k units of land, then x
h~
~l
 k:
Let Uh
 
!; p; t!; !; 

!

= fmaxfxg uh
 
x; h(; !)

: BCh(!) holdsg be the
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indirect utility of a consumer h with a membership in a jurisdiction type !;
given the prices p; t!; !, and 

!:
Equilibrium: We consider the notion of a price-taking equilibrium (prices
precede maximization) as an e¢ cient summary of the equilibrium corresponding
to a competitive theory of jurisdictions.
Denition 1: An equilibrium for this Berglas economy consists of a vector
of bundles and memberships (x; ) and prices (p; t;  ; ) such that:
(E.1) Consumers choose optimally: if there exists (~xh~! ; ~
h(; ~!)) 2 Xh such
that uh(~xh~! ; ~
h(; ~!)) > uh(xh! ; 
h(; !)); then the membership ~h(; ~!) is
such that p(~xh~!   e) + t~! + p ~!   ~! > 0.
(E.2) No prots in the provision of public goods:P
2 n

!(t

! + p!) = pc(g!);8! 2 
.
(E.3) No prots in the production of private goods:
py!((n

!)2) =
P
 

!n

!; 8! 2 
:
(E.4) Market clearing for private goods:P

R
H()
 
xh   e d+P! (!)  c (g!)  y!((n!)2) = 0.
(E.5) Consistency: ^ is consistent for H = [H():
The following assumption (Desirability of endowments) is needed in order
to assure that the weak core and the strong core coincide (we refer to EGSZ
(1999) for the distinction between both concepts). Our Assumption A4 di¤ers
slightly from EGSZ (2006) in that here we address the possibility that some visas
may require some consumers to satisfy some minimum consumption of capital.
Assumption A4 (Endowments are desirable): For every consumer h 2
H and every consumption choice (xh ; h) 2 Xh for which uh(xh ; h) >
uh(eh ; 0); there exists ~xh  xh ; ~xh 6= xh ; such that (~xh ; h) 2 Xh and
~xh  k, where k  0 stands for the capital requirement of membership h :
The last remaining assumption (A5) is needed in order to prevent the min-
imum expenditure situation (see EGSZ (1999) for an example where a quasi-
equilibrium fails to be an equilibrium in an economy where the private goods are
used as inputs for the production of public projects). Let us rst introduce the
following denitions. The pair (x; ) is said to be a feasible state for a measura-
ble set H  H if (x; ) 2 Xh satises the budget constraints for each h 2 H
12
and, for the set of consumers H, conditions (E.4) and (E.5) hold. Now let l0
be a vector in RL+ consisting of one unit of the l0 commodity and nothing else.
Say that (x; ) is jurisdiction linked if whenever L^ [ L = L is a partition of
the set of private goods and xhl = 0 for all l 2 L^ and almost all consumers
h 2 H, then for almost all consumers h 2 H there exists r > 0 and l0 2 L
such that uh(e + rl0 ; 0) > uh(xh ; h(; !)), 8:13 We say that our economy
is jurisdiction irreducible if every feasible allocation is jurisdiction linked.
Assumption A5: Our economy is jurisdiction irreducible.
3 Results
Theorem 1 (Existence): Let assumptions A1-A5 and B1-B3 hold for this
Berglas economy. Then, there exists an equilibrium.
In Section 5 we explain the novel aspects of our simultaneous optimization
approach for proving Theorem 1 and the main di¤erences with earlier proofs (core
decentralization approach (see Conley andWooders (1997) and ACW (2009)) and
non-excess demand approach (see EGSZ (1999)). In Section 6 we present the
generalized game and the proof.
In our next result we establish the core equivalence theorem for our economy.
Let us rst introduce the following denitions. We say that (x; ) is in the core
if there is no subset of H  H with (H) > 0 and a feasible state (~x; ~) for H
such that uh
 
~xh ; ~h
  uh  xh ; h for all types  2  and all h 2 H, and
uh
0

 
~xh
0
 ; ~h
0


> uh
0

 
xh
0
 ; h
0


for all types  2  and all h0 2 H 0  H with
(H 0) > 0: A feasible state (x; ) is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible state
(~x; ~) for H such that uh
 
~xh ; ~h
  uh  xh ; h for almost all h 2 H and
uh
0

 
~xh
0
 ; ~h
0


> uh
0

 
xh
0
 ; h
0


for all h0 2 H 0  H with (H 0) > 0:
The following assumption is needed in order to guarantee that every core state
can be supported as an equilibrium. It requires that, for every jurisdiction type
! = (g!; y!;
 
n!

2), (i) the prole of consumers
 
n!

2 satises the optimal
13This is read as follows: if the entire social endowment of private goods is used to produce
public projects, then, for almost every consumer h 2 H and every  2 ; there exists some
good l0 =2 L^ and some su¢ ciently large level of consumption of this good such that every agent
would prefer to consume his endowment together with this large level of good l0, and belong
to no jurisdiction, rather than to consume the bundle xh in the jurisdiction membership
h (; !):
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proportions ! that maximize the CRS production technology y!; and (ii) the
positive measure (!) is absolutely continuous with respect to the measure .
For the latter assumption let us rst dene the set of consumers with membership
m = (; !) by H^! = fh 2 H : h(; !) = 1; 8g, and denote by H^! a subset of
H^! for which ^ is consistent, i.e., H^! = fh 2 H^! : 9(!) s.t. ^(; !) = (!)n!;
8g. Recall that if a state (x; ) is in the core, then  is consistent by denition,
and therefore, such a measure  exists. Denote the measure space associated with
H^! by (H^!;H!; ), where H! is the set of subsets H^! of H^!. The production
associated with H^! 2 H! is then y!(H^!) = (!)y!((n!)2):
Assumption A6: For every ! 2 
, (i) n!=n! = ! for all  2 , where
! are the proportions that maximize the CRS production technology y!, and (ii)
if (H!) = 0 ; then y!(H^!) = 0:
Theorem 2 (Core equivalence): Let Assumptions A1-A4 and B1-B3 hold
for this Berglas economy. Then, every equilibrium is in the core. If also Assump-
tions A5 and A6 are imposed, then the core coincides with the set of equilibria.
We leave the proof of Theorem 2 for Section 6. We incorporate to the proof
of EGSZ (1999, Theorem 5.1) the private goods production side. For that, we
must accommodate the total production of private goods in order to nd prices
(p; t) 2 RL RjMj; (p; t) 6= (0; 0), that separate the two constructed convex
cones. But our main di¢ culty is to show that the there exists a measurable
function !(p; !; ) of H! into R+ such that, for every H^! 2 H!, py!(H^!) =R
H^!
!(p; !; )d; for any given p:What is important to see here is that without
Assumption A6 the mapping py!() of H! into R+ fails to be countably additive
and, therefore, the existence of a Radon-Nykodyn derivative !(p; !; ) is not
guaranteed (see Hildebrand (1968)). Countable additivity of the mapping py!()
fails if, for a countable family fH i!gi2I of pairwise disjoint subsets of H^!, it
happens that py!([iH i!) 6=
P
i py!(H
i
!): A constant returns to scale technology
y! is maximized only at the optimal proportions !. Unfortunately, there might
exist sets (H i!)i2I 2 H! and a consistent choice function where the union [iH i!
exhibits the optimal proportions, but where the proportions of consumerstypes
for each of these sets (H i!)i2I are not optimal.
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4 Heterogeneous Tiebout communities
Indirect utility and proportions: We write the consumer hs indirect utility
with a membershipm = (; !) as a function of the proportions ! = (

!)2 and
the level of congestion n!, that is, Uh(g!; y!; n!; !; p; t

!; !; 

!). Observe that
Uh
 
g!; y!; (n

!)2; p; t

!; !; 

!

can be rewritten as above using two arguments,
! and n! (by letting n

! = 

!n!). The rst argument (the proportions !) enter
into the consumers budget constraint through the wages !(p; !) due to our
Assumption A3 (CRS production technology), and therefore the proportions !
can be used as a direct argument of Uh . The second argument (the level of
congestion n!) enter as a direct argument of Uh , since the primitive utility
function ~uh depends on n! (by Assumption B3). Notice that the identities of
the other consumers making use of the jurisdiction public goods do not appear in
Uh(g!; y!; n!; !; p; t

!; !; 

!), consistent with our assumption B3 (anonymous
crowding).
Index of heterogeneity: Let us now propose the following index of hetero-
geneity (H) in a jurisdiction:
I! (; 
0) =
max !  min0 0!
 2 [0; 1] (H)
The heterogeneity in a jurisdiction can be classied as follows. We say that
a community is mixed (or heterogeneous) when there is at least more than one
consumer type in it, that is, there exists (; 0) with  6= 0 such that I! (; 0) 6= 1:
We denote the prole of proportions of a heterogeneous community !HET by
!HET : We shall say that two jurisdictions ! and !
0 have the same vector of
proportions if for all  2 , ! = !0 ; that is, if I! (; 0) = 0; 8 (; 0) : When
I! (; 
0) = 0 andminf!; 
0
! g 6= 0, the two types  and 0 of consumers are in the
same proportions in a jurisdiction type !; and therefore, the jurisdiction type !
is uniformly heterogeneous on these two types of consumers. When I! (; 
0) > 0
and minf!; 
0
! g 6= 0; the jurisdiction ! is mix-populated by the two types
of consumers but in di¤erent proportions. If I! (; 
0) = 1;80 6= , then the
jurisdiction type has a homogeneous population of type  consumers, that is,
!HOM() has a vector (0; :::; 1; :::; 0) with 1 in the  component but 0 otherwise.
Let us now provide a su¢ cient (endogenous) condition for the existence of
heterogeneous Tiebout communities, useful for performing comparative statics
among the set of equilibria.
Equilibrium comparative statics: An (endogenous) su¢ cient condition
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for the formation of a heterogeneous community is that, for every consumer h
and every type of homogeneous jurisdiction !HOM();
Uh(!HET ; p; t

!HET
; !HET ; 

!HET
) > Uh(!HOM(); p; t

!HOM()
; !HOM() ; 

!HOM()
)
(ESC1)
This condition is endogenous to the model, as it depends on equilibrium
variables, such as equilibrium prices. A more intuitive (endogenous) condition
could be obtained if one considered a separable utility function14 of the form
~uh  ~uh(x!) + ~uh(g!; n!). Then, an (endogenous) su¢ cient condition for the
formation of a heterogeneous community !HET is that, for every consumer h
and every type of homogeneous jurisdiction !HOM();
~uh(xh!HET ) + ~u
h(g!HET ; n!HET ) > ~u
h(xh!HOM()) + ~u
h(g!HOM (); n!HOM())
(ESC2)
where xh 2 argmaxuh  x; h(; !) such that BCh(!) holds, given the pair
(y! ; !): (ESC2) guarantees that the loss in utility from not consuming the most
preferred public goods in !HET (~uh(g!HET ; n!HET ) < ~u
h(g!HOM() ; n!HOM())) is
more than compensated by the higher wages that the consumer obtains in the
heterogeneous community, in turn increasing consumers utility through a greater
consumption of private goods, due to the good labor complementarities and high
productivity of the jurisdiction industry. Glaeser and Saiz (2004) provide an
empirical justication of this e¤ect. These authors show that skilled cities are
growing because they are becoming more economically productive, not because
these cities are becoming more attractive places to live.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the primitives: In a Berglas
(1976) economy, where the production of private goods depends on labor inputs
and consumers do not care about the identities of the other consumers that con-
sume the jurisdiction public goods, it is easy to see that there are two necessary
conditions on the primitives for the existence of a mixed community, already
identied by Berglas (1976).
(NC1) Labor skills must be di¤erent among consumers.
Condition (NC1) is necessary. To see this, we can think of an economy with
14Assumption A5, which guarantees that private goods are essential (Mas-Colell (1980)),
excludes separability between private and local public goods. Guilles and Scotchmer (1997)
show that the essentiality of private goodsassumption can be dispensed with if one considers
instead the assumptions exhaustion of blocking opportunitiesand e¢ cient scale.
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anonymous crowding where all types of consumers have identical labor skills but
di¤erent preferences on public goods. These consumers cannot increase their
utility by producing in an industry with a production technology based on labor
complementarities, and therefore the consumers will be better o¤ in the standard
homogeneous Tiebout communities.
(NC2) Labor complementarities in the production of private goods, i.e., there
exists a production technology y 2 Y such that d(y(()2))
d1::: > 0.
In the absence of a collaborative production process, the well known result that
homogenous groups coalesce around like individuals will apply in an economy
with anonymous crowding. See Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) for this result
and McGuire (1991) for a detailed normative analysis on this issue.
We nish with a su¢ cient condition on the primitives that assures that, if
there are two types of consumers moving from a homogeneous jurisdiction to an
heterogeneous jurisdiction that experience su¢ ciently rich increments in their
marginal productivities (due to the complementarities in the joint production
process), then mixed communities will form in equilibrium. In Proposition 1
we restrict to the simplest scenario of a one good production economy, although
there can be several goods transacted in this economy. This assumption is needed
in order to associate the consumers wage with his marginal productivity in
production, but where prices are absent (since the price of the produced good
can be normalized to one).
Proposition 1 (Su¢ cient condition): Assume that Assumptions A1-A6
and B1-B3 hold. Also assume that all jurisdiction industries produce only one
good. Let ! = (g!; y!; (n!; n
0
! )) be a jurisdiction type with y! satisfying (NC2).
Then, there exists an equilibrium with heterogenous communities if there is a
group of consumers H 2 H formed only by consumer types  and 0 satisfying
(NC1), and a vector " = ("; :::; ") 2 RL++ such that, for any pair of bundles x; x0 2
RL+ and pair of jurisdiction types (!; !0) = ((g!; y!; n!); (g!0 ; y!0 ; n
0
!0)), we have
that ~uh(x+ "; g!; n!) > ~uh(x; g!; n!) and ~uh0 (x0+ "; g!; n!) > ~uh0 (x0; g!0 ; n!0)
for all h; h0 2 H, and such that the weighted productivity increment
  0!

@y!(n

!; n
0
! )
@
0   @y!
0(n
0
!0)
@
0

+ !

@y!(n

!; n
0
! )
@
  @y!(n

!)
@

satises
 > "+ max
(~;~!)=(;!);(0;!0)

~
!
@y~!(n
~
~!)
@~
+ 2maxf0! ; !gmax
l;
e

l +max
l
cl(g!)
n!
(SC)
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Condition (SC) says that the weighted increase in productivity from a state
composed by homogeneous jurisdictions (! and !0) to another state composed by
an heterogeneous jurisdiction (!) must be enough to pay for: 1) the consumption
increment " > 0, 2) the highest productivity between the two types of consumers
when producing in homogeneous communities, weighted by the proportions of
this type of consumer in the heterogeneous community !, 3) the double of the
highest individual good endowment weighted by the highest proportion of con-
sumer types in !, and 4) the highest possible per capita cost in terms of one
good required to constitute the jurisdiction !.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is that mixed communities are optimal and
exist in equilibrium if there exists two types of consumers with a consumption
increment " > 0 satisfying (SC), and for whose gains from labor complementari-
ties (through higher wages) outweigh the cost (in utility terms) of not consuming
the most preferred public goods in the jurisdiction. Observe that the su¢ cient
condition in Proposition 1 is obtained only on the primitives of our economy,
and that the pair (x; x0) can be any pair of consumption bundles, not necessarily
the equilibrium ones. Also notice that Proposition 1 does not assert that the
heterogeneous communities that form in equilibrium will be of type !, neither
says which will be the equilibrium consumption bundle.
The following examples demonstrates that condition (SC) is not necessary
for the existence of optimal heterogeneous communities; it is only a su¢ cient
condition. Also, the example illustrates the group composition problem that
arises when wages depend on a prole of di¤erent types of labor and consumers
have di¤erent tastes for public goods.
Example 1: Let there be two types of consumers,  = 1; 2, with the same
measure for each type, i.e., 1 = 2  : There is only one perfectly divisi-
ble good, the price of which is 1. Good endowments are e1 = 3 and e2 = 2;
respectively. Let us consider three types of jurisdiction, !1 = (g1; yS; (2; 0));
!2 = (g2; yS; (0; 2)) and !3 = (g3; yC ; (1; 1)): For tractability, we assume n! = 2,
for all ! = !1; !2; !3, so congestion is not a decisive factor to discriminate among
jurisdiction types. The production technology yC is collaborative, with the fol-
lowing form: yC = 20
p
n1n2. The labor inputs of the production technology
yS are perfect substitutes, with functional form yS = 3n1 + n2: The equilibrium
wages are 1!1 = 3, 
2
!2
= 1 and 1!3 = 
2
!3
= 10: The three public goods cost the
same, c(g!) = 2, ! = !1; !2; !3, although all di¤er in terms of their characteris-
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tics (say, in their location). Utilities are dened as follows: ~u1(x; g1; 2) = 13
p
x ;
~u1(x; g3; 2) =
1
4
p
x , ~u2(x; g2; 2) = 14
p
x and ~u2(x; g3; 2) = 15
p
x .
For these parameters there is no " > 0 that satises (SC). However, heteroge-
neous communities of type !3 will form in equilibrium.15 Prices are p = 1; ! = 1
for all ! = !1; !2; !3, t1!1 = t
2
!2
= 0 (since jurisdictions !1 and !2 are composed
of homogeneous consumers) and t1!3 =  t2!3 =  2:02.16 Indirect utilities are
U1(!1; 1; 0; 1; 3) = 0:74, U1(!3; 1; 2:02; 1; 10) = 0:93, U2(!2; 1; 0; 1; 1) = 0:35,
and U2(!3; 1; 2:02; 1; 3) = 0:59: Both types of consumers are better o¤ in juris-
diction !3, even if both consumer types consume the less preferred public good
(g3). This is because wages are higher in !3 than in both !1 and !2 due to
the labor complementarities in the production technology yC : Thus, we can con-
clude that the core is characterized by heterogeneous communities with prole
(n1; n2) = (1; 1): Consistency holds by making (!3) = . Assumption A6 holds
for our restricted set of jurisdiction types. Thus, by Theorem 2, we know that
the core coincides with the set of equilibria. Therefore, we can claim that, for
this example, the Berglas equilibrium is characterized by heterogeneous Tiebout
communities of type !3 = (g3; yC ; (1; 1)). 
5 Final remarks
Visa permits and pricing: Each member evaluates a visa m = (; !) through
the corresponding personalized membership price q!  t! + p!  ! (tax net
of wage). The pricing of visas in our framework is more complex than it would
be in a standard local public good economy, as the tax system depends on the
community composition, but also the wages depend on the labor complementar-
ities of the workers in the jurisdiction industry. Observe that it may occur that,
even if t! + p! > 0; we have q

! < 0 (negative visa price), as the wage more
than compensates the tax payment. In this sense, the wage ! can be seen as a
lump-sum premium (or subsidy) paid to the consumer for his good (bad) labor
complementaries with the other consumers of his jurisdiction. Below, in our gen-
eralized game (Section 6), the personalized membership price q! is decomposed
15If endowments were e1 = 3=2 and e2 = 2 instead, then there is an " > 0 that sat-
ises (SC), and !3 is preferred by both consumer types, since U1(!1; 1; 0; 1; 3) = 0:62,
U1(!3; 1; 2:61; 1; 10) = 0:90, U2(!2; 1; 0; 1; 1) = 0:35, and U2(!3; 1; 2:61; 1; 3) = 0:54.
16For !3; we choose t1!3 to maximize
P
=1;2 ~u
(x; g!; n!) and make t2! =  t1! (since n1 =
n2 = 1) and the budget constraints to hold with equality.
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in: t! (reecting the consumers tastes for the public goods in the jurisdiction),
p! (the cost of nancing the local public goods), and ! (wage that reects the
consumers marginal productivity in the jurisdiction). This sort of di¤erentiated
pricing might be interesting for future empirical work.
Externalities and spatial considerations: Observe that in contrast to
EGSZ (2006) and Zame (2007), we do not consider externalities in the private
production, such as poor working conditions (in EGSZ (2006) wages are set to
internalize the production externalities). Neither do we consider local consump-
tion externalities within each jurisdiction (or development), as in Konishi (2011).
Our main focus here is to analyze the Berglasgroup composition problemas
it was initially conceived, where these types of externalities were not present.
Spatial considerations are absent in our model. However, space could be incor-
porated by assigning a location to every possible jurisdiction (following Konishi
(2008)). In such a spatial Berglaseconomy, any two jurisdictions that are suf-
ciently close geographically may have some residents in one jurisdiction that
benet from the public goods of the other jurisdiction. Such behavior has been
avoided in all previous Tiebout literature by assuming that every jurisdiction
has the capacity to expel illegal consumers(exclusion). In this sense, we are
also accepting this assumption in order to guarantee e¢ ciency. If this assump-
tion were absent, then the pricing would be ine¢ cient, as it would not capture
the externalities imposed by those commuters. Recovering e¢ ciency without the
exclusivity assumption is an interesting line of investigation, but is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Tastes and skills: Assumption B2 is essential for Theorem 2 to hold true
since skills (or endowments) act as an e¢ cient scal discriminatory device among
consumers, because such characteristics are linked in a one-to-one relationship
with the consumerstastes for public goods. This assumption might be justi-
ed in certain cases. For example, one could think that individuals that have
been assigned a certain type of job in the industry are prone to demand specic
health services. Individuals with di¤erent working conditions (say, miners and
engineers) will demand di¤erent public health services, and thus will be taxed
di¤erently. If signaling (through skills or endowments) does not exist, then an
equilibrium for this Berglas economy is not e¢ cient. The best hope in such a
scenario is a Lindahl pricing scheme.17
17A more sophisticated approach could then be taken. In particular, one could seek to make
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We observe that Assumption B2 can be relaxed in a novel way.
Assumption B20: Consumers of the same type are assigned the same en-
dowments, skills, and tastes for public goods, but may have di¤erent preferences
for private goods.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 also holds true under assumption B2 0. However,
Schmeidlers (1973) purication result can no longer be applied (see discussion
below). Also, Theorem 2 holds true if B2 0 is imposed instead.
On the equilibrium existence technique: We investigate the problem
of existence of a price taking equilibrium by transforming it into a problem of
existence of a social system equilibrium (Debreu (1952)). Our approach is by
simultaneous optimization. As Arrow and Debreu (1954) assert, with a general-
ized game we are able to test in a clearer way the consistency of the equations
that describe the model. In the simultaneous optimization approach each player
maximizes a payo¤ function on a constraint set. Both the payo¤ function and the
constraint set may be parameterized by the other playersactions. This second
dependence does not occur in games. The extension is a mathematical object
referred to as a generalized game by Debreu (1952). In the generalized game
there are auctioneers that mimic the market by choosing the prices optimally
in order to make the excess demand zero (if it is positive (negative) for some
commodities the auctioneer chooses higher (lower) prices for those goods).
Kakutani : Both the non-excess demand approach and the simultaneous op-
timization approach are applications of Kakutanis (1941) xed point theorem.
Debreu (1982) clearly exposes the two parallel approaches in a rigorous way. The
non-excess demand approach constructs an excess demand correspondence and
nds a price vector that makes it zero. To assure this, it uses the theorem of
Gale (1955), Nikaido (1956), and Debreu (1956). The simultaneous optimization
approach, on the other hand, is an application of the Nash (1950) theorem to
a generalized game, known as the Debreu (1952) theorem. Arrow and Debreu
(1954) then applied the Debreu (1952) theorem to a social economic system,
where agents simultaneously seek to maximize their respective payo¤ functions.
Also it is fair to mention here the paper Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), which
is a more modern version of the Debreu (1952) social existence theorem. Schafer
and Sonnenschein proved that a competitive equilibrium exists also for abstract
skills an endogenous choice as in Conley and Wooders (2001). We refer to the original paper
for such a renement.
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economies with interdependent, price-dependent and non-ordered preferences.
The continuum extension: The three approaches (core, non excess demand
and simultaneous optimization approach) were initially conceived for an exchange
economy with a nite number of agents. The extension of the core approach to an
atomless local public good economy was done by Kaneko and Wooders (1986).
Since then, Wooders and coauthors have further enriched the model in many
di¤erent ways using the f-core notion. The application of the non-excess demand
approach to an atomless club economy was done by EGSZ (1999). For this EGSZ
(1999) followed the pioneering works of Aumann (1964, 1966). In the present
paper we not only provide the rst equilibrium existence proof for a club / local
public good economy using a generalized game, but also carry out this analysis in
the continuum of agents framework. Most of our extensions follow by application
of Hildebrands (1974) results. It is worth noting that the technique of proving
existence of equilibrium in a nonatomic economy using a generalized game has
been useful in the incomplete markets literature (see for example, Araujo, Orrillo
and Páscoa (2000) and Araujo and Páscoa (2002)). However, this technique has
never been applied to a local public goods nonatomic economy.
Purication: Finally, we wish to stress that our purication result also departs
from earlier works on club / local public good economies. The discreteness of
the set of public projects (in the sense of Ellickson (1979) and Mas-Colell (1980))
requires a continuum of agents in order to convexify agentsstrategy sets. How-
ever, purication of playersmixed strategies cannot be done using Schmeidlers
(1973) result if agents of the same type have the same tastes on public projects,
but can di¤er in their preferences on the private goods (Assumption B20). This
implies that their demands for commodities may be di¤erent among consumers
of the same type. Instead, we apply a particular result of Páscoa (1998), already
used by Araujo and Páscoa (2002, Lemma 2) in an incomplete markets economy,
which says that purication can be done if in the extended generalized game we
have playersmixed strategies depending only through nitely many indicators,
one for each type (a statistic indicator).
6 Generalized game and proofs
Theorem 1 is proved assuming that assumption B20 holds. Throughout the proof
we discuss how the proof can be modied if assumption B2 applies instead.
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Proof of Theorem 1: We rst construct a generalized game for a Ber-
glaseconomy and prove that it has an equilibrium. Then, we show that such
equilibrium is, in fact, an equilibrium.
The generalized game: In the generalized game a player k chooses his
strategy s(k) parameterized by the other agentsstrategies s k. For this economy
the game is played by the consumers and four additional auctioneers. We divide
the consumersoptimization problem into two stages.
Stage 1 : Consumer h chooses his most preferred consumption bundle for a
given jurisdiction membership m = (; !) with h(; !) = 1:
max
fx!g
uh
 ; h(; !) s.t. p(x!   e) + t! + p!   !  0
Observe that the terms in BCh(!) are all multiplied by 
h(; !); but we omit
it as we know that h(; !) = 1 (the consumer is evaluating his utility at this
specic jurisdiction type). Let us denote consumer hs demand correspondence
for private goods at jurisdiction ! by 	(h; !)  fargmax uh
 ; h(; !) :
BC!(h) holdsg. Note that, for a consumer h; the correspondence h ! 	(h; !)
has a measurable graph (see Hildebrand (1974, p. 59, Proposition 1.b)).
Commodity prices can be shown to be positive. The usual procedure is to
build a truncated economy by adjoining a few agents of each type with utilities
linear in the consumption of the private good. For this truncated economy,
the prices of private goods and memberships belong to compact sets. Using
a feasibility argument we can show that commodity prices are positive along
the sequence. Then, we can apply Fatous lemma to show that the sequence
of truncated economies has an equilibrium, independent of the truncation (the
measure of the set of articial adjoined agents goes to zero). For simplicity, we
omit this procedure and refert to EGSZ (1999).
Claim 1: 	(h; !) has nonempty convex compact values and is continuous.
Proof : Compactness follows because
P

R
H()
ed <1. By quasiconcavity
of uh and convexity of the values of the budget correspondence Bh(p; q!; !; 

!;
!)  fxh! 2 RL+ : BC(h) holdsg, it follows that 	(h; !) has convex val-
ues. The budget correspondence B(h; p; q!; !; 

!; !) and the utility function
uh(x!; 
h(; !)) are continuous in x. By Berges Maximum theorem and en-
dowment desirability, 	(h; !) is upper semi-continuous. Lower semi-continuity
of 	(h; !) follows by the interiority of endowments assumption. Actually, at
nonzero commodity prices the consumers budget constraint holds with strict
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inequality by choosing a su¢ ciently small consumption bundle. Thus, 	(h; !)
is continuous. 
Let 	(; !) =
R
H()
	(h; !)d be a measurable correspondence from the
continuum of type  consumers at jurisdiction ! into RL+: Observe that there
is a measurable selection h !  (h; !) from the correspondence 	(; !); and
we can therefore choose an aggregate demand vector
R
H()
 (h; !)d. BecauseR
H()
 (h; !)d is the integral of upper semicontinuous demands with respect
to a nonatomic measure, we have that
R
H()
 (h; !)d is upper semicontinuous,
with compact, convex, and nonempty values.
Stage 2 : Given their optimal consumption bundles, consumers choose their
most preferred jurisdiction type (notice that the consumer being alone in a ju-
risdiction is a possibility). Let Uh
 
!; p; t!; !; 

!
  uh( (h; !); h(; !)):
Then, h(; !) = 1 for ! 2 argmaxUh  !; p; t!; !; !. We represent the pure
strategy of consumer h by a basis vector of dimension 
: The vector h(; !)
is the vector in R
 with 1 as !th coordinate and zero otherwise.
Auctioneer 1 chooses  = (!)2;!2
 to minfg
P
!;((

!   p @y!@! ((n

!)2))R
H()
h(; !)d)2, where @y!
@!
((n!)2) denotes the marginal productivity of a
type  consumer evaluated at the crowding prole
 
n!

2 2 N+:
Auctioneer 2 chooses a poll fee ! 2 RL+ common to all individuals in the
jurisdiction (! =  !;82 ) such that it covers the cost of providing the juris-
diction public project, i.e., minfg
P
!(p(!   c(g!)n! )
P

R
H()
h(; !)d)2.
Auctioneer 3 chooses a vector of prices ft!g2;!2
; with t! 2 Trans; in order
to minftg
P
!(
P
 t

!
R
H()
h(; !)d)2.
Claim 2: Auctioneers 1, 2, and 3s strategy sets are nonempty, convex, and
compact.
Proof: Strategy sets are convex since !; ! and t

! belong to the real num-
bers, for all  and !. Transfers are bounded, t! 2 [T (); T+()]: The upper
bound is T+() = Lmaxl
P

R
H()
el d+ max!
P

R
H()
!d; since p 2 L 1:
The term
P

R
H()
!d is bounded because y!  A!; with A! 2 (0;1)L; (by
Assumption A3(i)). This implies that Auctioneer 1s strategy set is compact. The
lower bound on the lump-sum transfers is T () = minf0;max!
P
0 6= n
0
! T
+(0)g.
The argument is well known. If some consumers are paying large negative lump-
sum transfers, then others must be paying large positive lump-sum transfers,
which implies that some transfers are canceled with some others (for t! 2 Trans).
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Hence, Auctioneer 3s strategy set is compact. Finally, notice that poll taxes
are bounded since pc (g!) =n! is a nite constant component, and c (g!)  0
is bounded from above by assumption. Hence, Auctioneer 2s strategy set is
compact. 
Auctioneer 4 chooses p in4L 1 in order to make the aggregate excess demand
as expensive as possible, i.e., max
fpg
(p), where (p)  p(P RH()  xh   e d+P
! (!)
 
c(g!)  y!((n!)2)

)+
P
!;
t!
R
H()
h(; !)d:
Claim 3: (p) is bounded below, upper hemicontinuous, and convex-valued.
Proof: The compact-valued correspondence h ! 	(h; !; p) is bounded be-
low by 0 and above by the integrable function h ! (w1p1 ; :::; wLpL ), where wl =P
 (H())e

l + A!, l 2 L. We have pl > 0;8l. According to Hildebrand (1974,
p. 62, Theorem 2),
R
H()
	(h; !; p)d 6= ;. And according to Hildebrand (1974,
p. 73, Proposition 7) this set, which is bounded below by 0, is also compact.
Therefore,
P
2
R
H()
 (h; !)d is nonempty and compact. Upper hemicon-
tinuity of the correspondence p ! 	(h; !; p) on the interior of the simplex
follows by Hildebrand (1974, p. 73, Proposition 8). Therefore, the correspon-
dence
P
2
R
H()
 (h; !)d is upper hemicontinuous. The correspondence being
convex-valued is a consequence of Lyapounovs convexity theorem of an atomless
nite dimensional vector measure (see Hildebrand (1974, p. 62, Theorem 3)). By
a parallel argument as above, there is a measurable selection h ! h(; !) with
an associated aggregate demand vector
P

R
H()
h(; !)d, which is the integral
of upper semicontinuous demands with respect to a non-atomic measure. Thus,P

R
H()
h(; !)d is upper semicontinuous, with compact (by the requirementP
m 
h(m) = 1; for a.e. h), convex (by Lyapounovs convexity theorem) and
nonempty values. 
Denition GGE: An equilibrium for the constructed generalized game con-
sists of a vector of bundles and memberships (x; ) and a vector of prices (p; t;  ; )
such that each player k chooses a strategy s(k) to solve his respective optimiza-
tion problem parameterized in the other playersactions s k.
Proposition 2: There exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the con-
structed generalized game.
Proof: Note that a consumers strategy of choosing his most preferred juris-
diction type in stage 2 has a nite and discrete space domain 
; since the set 
of consumer types, the set G of public projects, the set N  N+ of consumers
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proles, and the set Y of production technologies are nite (and thus discrete).
In order to circumvent this problem, we extend our generalized game to allow
for consumersmixed strategies in the set of jurisdiction types. Let us denote
(
) = f = ((!))!2
 : (!)  0;
P
!2
 (!) = 1g: Then, (
) stands for the
convex hull of (1; :::; !; :::;
); which is the set of mixed strategies for each con-
sumer. A prole of strategies  : H!(
) brings the continuum of consumers
into strategies (pure or mixed).
Consumer hs stage 2 optimization problem extended to mixed strategies is
such that this consumer randomizes over the possible consumptions in the di¤er-
ent jurisdiction types. We write Uh
 
; p; t!; !; 

!
  uh (P! (!) (h; !); ).
That is, consumer randomizes in 
 = f1; :::;
g, but not directly in consumption
bundles. Then, consumer hs stage 2 maximization problem is max2(
) Uh(;
p; t;  ; ): The utility uh (
P
! (!) (h; !); ) is a continuous bounded real
valued function on
P
! (!) (h; !), and the mixed strategy  belongs to the
convex compact set (
): R(h) = f 2 (
) :  2 argmaxUh
 
; p; t;  ; 
g
denotes the set of mixed strategies that solve consumer hs second stage maxi-
mization problem.
We must extent the ctitious auctioneersproblems to allow for consumers
mixed strategies. Given a mixed strategy prole  : H ! (
) and the vector
of consumersdemand for commodities evaluated in their optimal jurisdiction
membership, ( (h; h(; !))h2H, we can rewrite the continuous linear function
of Auctioneer 4 in terms of mixed strategies as follows18
p!  0(p) P RH()((R
 p (h; h(; !))+ (t!+ p!  !))d(h)  pe)d.
Objective functions (p) and  0(p) are obtained by aggregating consumers
budget constraints. While for  0(p) it is in terms of consumersmixed strategies,
(p) holds for pure strategies. (p) and  0(p) are equivalent in a degenerate
equilibrium if consistency holds and prots are zero (we will prove below that
consistency and zero prots actually hold in equilibrium).
Auctioneer 1, 2, and 3s objective functions extended to mixed strategies
become, respectively,
!P!2
(P2(!   p @y!@! ((n!)2)) RH() (h)(!)d)2,
 !P!2
(p(!   (c(g!)=n!))P2 RH() (h)(!)d)2,
18Observe that for Auctioneer 4s objective function we could have writtenP
!2
  (h; 
h (; !)d(h)(!) instead of
R


 (h; 
h (; !)d(h):
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t!P!2
(P2 t! RH() (h)(!)d)2.
All the conditions of Debreus (1952) theorem hold. Thus, we can assert that
the extended generalized game has an equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies.
At this point it remains to show that a degenerate equilibrium of the extended
generalized game is, in fact, an equilibrium of the original game.
Proposition 3: The generalized game has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: Recall that from Assumption A1 there is a continuum of consumers
of each type with positive measure. Observe that Auctioneers 1, 2, and 3s new
objective functions depend only on the average of the consumersprole, which
satises Schmeidler (1973) hypotheses. However, Schemeidlers hypotheses are
not satised by Auctioneer 4s payo¤ function  0(p).19 Instead, the conditions
in Páscoa (1998) and Araujo and Páscoa(2002, Lemma 2) are satised for this
auctioneers objective function, as it depends on the prole of mixed strategies
 = (h)h2H only through nitely many indicators, one for each type , of the
form
R
H()
R


( (h; 
h(; !))d(h)d:
20 Given a mixed strategies equilibrium
prole ; there exists a prole  = ((h; !))h2H();2 such that the Dirac mea-
sure ^(h) at h(; !) is an extreme point of the setR(h), which is consumer hs
best response to the prices chosen by the auctioneers in the previous equilibrium
in mixed strategies. Moreover,
R
H()
R


 (h; (h; !))d(h)d is the same asR
H()
R


 (h; (h; !))d^(h)d: Hence, we can replace  by (^(h))h2H();2
and keep all the equilibrium conditions satised. In fact, once this replacement is
done, payo¤ functions (p) and  0(p) can easily be shown to be equivalent. The
indicators that the atomic auctioneer takes as given evaluated at ^ are still the
same as when they were evaluated at : Therefore, ^ is a degenerate equilibrium
prole.
Notice that if we had assumed instead that consumers of the same type have
the same preferences for private goods (Assumption B2), then we would have a
common best response  (; !) instead of one  (h; !) for each consumer h of
this type. In that case, Schmeidlers (1978) purication result could be applied,
since we could write
R
H()
R


 (h; 
h(; !))d(h)d as
R


 (; h(; !))d(
I
H()
19Schmeidlers (1973) purication result cannot be applied, as it requires a common best
demand response for all consumers of the same type.
20In fact, our framework is even simpler than the Páscoa (1998) and Araujo and Páscoa
(2002, Lemma 2) purication result, since purication has to be done within each type  2 
of consumer.
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(h)d); where the term
I
H()
(h)d is the Gelfand integral of ': In that case,
we should check that the market auctioneers objective function is continuous
with respect to the convergence in distribution21. 
Proposition 4: An equilibrium for the generalized game (in pure strategies)
is an equilibrium.
Proof: Let us consider the generalized game introduced above, but where
the consumption allocations have an upper bound U  RL+ that exceeds the
attainability upper bound by an arbitrary small amount. Let ( ; ; p; t;  ; ) be
an equilibrium in pure strategies of the generalized game.
First notice that Auctioneer 3s minimization problem implies
P
!; t

!
R
H()
h
(; !)d = 0. Now, let us show that ^ is consistent. If consistency fails, then (!)
is such that
P
(t

! + p!   !)(!)n! <
P
(t

! + p!   !)^(; !): But then,
this strict inequality enters into contradiction with the solution to Auctioneer 4s
maximization problem.
Observe that the market auctioneers problem is now maxfpg 
00(p), where
 00(p)  p(P;! RH()  xh!   e d+P! (!)(c(g!)  y!((n!)2))), sinceP!; t!R
H()
h(; !)d = 0 (as shown above). We now show that there is no commo-
dity excess demand. Suppose there is excess demand of commodity l. Then, the
price auctioneer sets pl equal to 1, but then the whole function 
00(p) becomes
positive, a contradiction with the aggregation of the budget constraints.
Commodities markets clear. Suppose not, that is,
P
;!
R
H()
 
 l(h; !)  el

d
+
P
! (!) (cl(g!)  yl;!((n!)2)) < 0 for some l 2 L: Then, the market auc-
tioneer chooses pl su¢ ciently close to zero, which would make  l(h) hit the
bound U; for every individual, a contradiction with feasibility.
From Auctioneers 1, 2, and 3s optimization problems in the generalized game,
we have py!((n!)2) =
P
 

!n

! and
P
2 n

!(t

! + p!) = pc(g!);8! 2 
.
Let us now show that consumers are quasi-optimizing, that is, if (~xh~! ; ~
h(; ~!))
2 Xh with ~xh~! 2 Bh(p; q~!;  ~!; ~!; ~!) and uh(~xh~! ; ~h(; ~!)) > uh( (h; !); h
(; !)); then p~xh~! +t

~! + p ~!  ~!   e  0: Suppose not, that is, such allocation
(~xh! ; ~
h(; ~!)) is strictly preferred to ( (h; !); h(; !)), and p~x
h
~! + t

~!+p ~! 
21Call the market auctioneers objective function . Convergence in distribution occurs
if a sequence of pure strategies proles h (; !n) that converges to h (; !) is such thatR
H
g(h (; !n))d converges to
R
H
g(h (; !))d, for any bounded continuous transformation
g of h (; !): Then, (h (; !n)) converges to (h (; !)):
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~! e < 0: But then, at such preferred optimum, the aggregation of consumers
budget constraints holds with strict inequality, a contradiction to market clearing
and
P
!; t

!
R
H()
h(; !)d = 0.
It remains to check that consumers are optimizing, that is, if (~xh~! ; ~
h(;
~!)) 2 Xh with ~xh~! 2 Bh(p; q~!;  ~!; ~!; ~!) and uh(~xh~! ; ~h(; ~!)) > uh( (h; !);
h(; !)); then p~xh~! + t

~!+p ~! ~! e > 0:We show that a quasi-equilibrium is
an equilibrium by contradiction. Suppose that the quasi-equilibrium ((x; ); (p; t;
; )) is not an equilibrium. Let there be a nonnull set of consumers who are
quasioptimizing but not optimizing. For each such consumer h; there is a choice
(~xh ; ~h) in which uh(~xh ; ~h) > uh(xh ; h) and p(~xh   e) + t~! + p ~! 
~!  0: Desirability of endowments entails that there exists another bundle
xh  ~xh with xh 6= ~xh and (xh ; ~h) 2 Xh ; and xh  k (where k  0 stands
for the capital requirement of membership ~h).22 By continuity, we can choose
the bundle xh such that pxh < p~xh and still have uh(xh ; ~h) > uh(xh ; h);
but p(xh   e) + t~! + p ~!   ~! < 0 (so (xh ; ~h) costs strictly less than his
quasi-equilibrium choice), a contradiction. 
Theorem 1 follows from Propositions 2, 3 and 4. 
Proof of Theorem 2: We rst prove that for this Berglas economy any
equilibrium (x; ) belongs to the core. Suppose not. Then there exists a block-
ing coalition ~H  H and a feasible allocation (~xh; ~h)h2 ~H with uh
 
~xh; ~h
 
uh
 
xh; h

for all h 2 ~H  H and uh0  ~xh0 ; ~h0 > uh0  xh0 ; h0 for those con-
sumers h0 in H 0  ~H with (H 0) > 0: Feasibility of (~x; ~) implies consistency
and market clearing for ~H and budget balance for all consumers in ~H: Such a
feasible and preferred state contradicts the equilibrium, where consumers choose
optimally in their budget sets. Therefore, (x; ) is in the core of this economy.
Pareto e¢ ciency immediately follows by letting ~H equal the whole population of
consumers H.
We now prove that, if in addition Assumption A6 is imposed in our Berglas
economy, then any core state (x; ) can be supported as an equilibrium. Let
us denote the consumer hs preferred set by h = f(~x; ) 2 Xh : uh(~x; ) >
uh(xh ; h)g. Since a consumer h can choose at most one membership, say
 = (; !) with jj = 1; we write () = c(g!)=n!. Let us be more explicit
22As EGSZ (2006) point out, this more restricted form of the consumption sets just requires
us to be more careful than EGSZ (1999) in the distinction between a quasi-equilibrium and
equilibrium.
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in notaion and denote the consumer hs wage function at jurisdiction ! by
!(p; !; h): For each consumer h 2 H, let h = f(~x; ) 2 Xh : (~x + e(h)+
(p; !; h)   ; ) 2 hg. Finally, dene the correspondence h = h [ f0g.
Observe that the correspondence  is measurable if the functions !(p; !; ) and
e() are measurable. The measurability of e() is guaranteed by assumption. It
remains to check that the function !(p; !; ) is measurable.
By Assumption A6, the mapping py!() of H! into R+ is countably additive
and dominated by  (since  is absolutely continuous with respect to ). Also,
py!(;) = 0. Thus, by the theorem of Radon-Nykodyn, there exists a measurable
function !(p; !; ) of H! into R+ such that py!(H^!) =
R
H^!
!(p; !; )d; for
any given set H^! 2 H! and any price p (see Hildebrand (1968). This in turn
implies the equilibrium condition of no-prots in the production of private goods.
Now, observe that the production possibility correspondence y! of H! into RL is
compact and convex (by Assumption A3(i) and the niteness of the measure )
for every H^! 2 H!. Also, 0 2 y!(H^!) for every H^! 2 H! (given our Assumption
A3(ii) and y!(H^!) = (!)y!((n!)2)). Then, it follows that there exists a
Radon-Nykodym derivative of y!(H^!) with respect to measure  (see Hildebrand
(1968)). That is, there exists a correspondence ! of H! into RL+ such that
Y!(H^!) =
R
H^!
!d for every H^! 2 H!.
Now, let Z = (
R
H
hd P! RH !d;P RH ~h(; !)d). Since the measure
space (H;H; ) is atomless, it follows by the Lyapounov convexity theorem that
Z is a nonempty convex subset of RL  RjMj: (See Hildebrand (1968)). We now
show that we can separate Z from a fatenough cone C, so that we guarantee
p 6= 0:The proof of Z \ C = ; follows EGSZ (1999, Theorem 5.1, Step 3),
where it is shown, by contradiction, that there is no state (x^; ^) preferred to
(x; ) that is feasible for an exactlyconsistent coalition23 whose agents choose
in their preferred set. Let us dene D = inffdist(conv(L);Cons) :L 2 Dg ;
where conv(L) denotes the convex hull of the set L and D = fL  Lists :
conv(L) \Cons = ;g: We now can construct the fattercone C = f(x; ) 2
RL RjMj : x <  W
D
dist(;Cons)(1; :::; 1)g: The upper bound on private goods
consumption, denoted by W , is di¤erent from EGSZ (1999), as in our economy
we also have to take into account the private goods production. Here, W =P

R
H()
ed+
P
! y!(H^!), where H^! = fh 2 H : h(; !) = 1;8g. As shown
below, y!(H^!) < 1, for p > 0. Once we modify this upper bound, the proof of
23Notice that Lemma 7.1 of EGSZ (1999), which asserts that such exactly consistent coalition
can be chosen, does not depend on the bound W:
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Z \ C = ; is analogous to EGSZ (1999).
By Minkowskis separation theorem there exist prices (p; t) 2 RL  RjMj;
(p; t) 6= (0; 0), such that (p; t)(x; )  0 for each (x; ) 2 C; and (p; t)z  0; for
each z 2 Z: By an argument similar to EGSZ (1999, Theorem 5.1, Step 4), we
have p 6= 0. The separation of convex cones implies that
p
X
!
y!(H^!)  p
X

Z
H
(~xh   e + !)d+
X
!
t!
X

Z
H
~h(; !)d (C)
Condition (C) implies that py!(H^!) <1 for all !, and thus !(p; !; ) can be
chosen as an integrable function of H^! in R+ (see Hildebrand (1968)).
We now show that almost every consumer chooses in their budget sets. Denote
by !(h(; !)) the poll tax paid at jurisdiction ! when membership h(; !):
Let E1 = fh 2 H : p(xh! + !(h(; !))) +t!h(; !) > e + !; 8g and
E2 = fh 2 H : p(xh! + !(h(; !))) +t!h(; !) < e + !;8g. The sets E1
and E2 are measurable, since endowments and wages are measurable functions.
Feasibility of (x; ) implies that if (E1) > 0; then (E2) > 0: By a procedure
similar to EGSZ (1999, Theorem 5.1, Step 4) we can choose a preferred mea-
surable selection (~x; ~) from the correspondence  so that p
X

Z
H
(~xh   e +
!)d+
X
!
t!
X

Z
H
~h(; !)d < p
X
!
y!(H^!); a contradiction with (C).
Thus, (E1) = 0:
Market clearing follows by aggregating consumersbudget constraints in E2
and the assumption that utilities are strictly monotonic in the consumption of
private goods. Quasi-optimization is proved as in EGSZ (1999, Theorem 5.1, Step
4), so we also omit this proof. Our Lemma 7 above shows that a quasiequilibrium
is an equilibrium. This concludes the proof that every core state can be supported
as an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us associate (x; ) with ! and (x; ) with !
and !0: Assume that (x; ) belongs to the core. Consistency of  is guaranteed
by choosing (!); (!) and (!0) such that (!) = (!)n!=n

! = (!
0)n
0
!0=n
0
! :
This is easy to see once we observe that (!)n! = (; !) = (H()) = (; !) =
(!)n! and (!)n
0
! = (
0; !) = (H(0)) = (0; !0) = (!0)n
0
!0 :
Let xh = xh + "; with " = ("; :::; ") 2 RL++; for every consumer h and every
type :Without loss of generality, we consider a consumer of type 0. Consumer
h0s budget constraints BCh0 (!) and BCh0 (!
0) are p(xh0 + c(g!)=n!) + t
0
! =
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pe
0
+
0
! and p(x
h0 + c(g!0)=n!0)+ t
0
!0 = pe
0+
0
!0 ; respectively, where 
0
! is the
wage that accommodates in BCh0 (!) the consumption increase ". Substracting
BCh0 (!
0) from BCh0 (!) and using x
h = xh+" and t
0
!0 = 0 (since all consumers
are homogeneous), we have 
0
!   
0
!0 = p(x
h0   e0 + " + c(g!)=n!) + t0! 
p(xh0   e0+ c(g!0)=n!0):
Using t! 2 Trans, we can write consumer hs budget constraint in ! as
follows, p(xh + " + c(g!)=n!)  (n0! =n!)t
0
! = pe
 + !. Then, substituting
t
0
! = (n

!=n
0
! )(p(x
h   e + "+ c(g!)=n!)   !) in the previous equation and
removing the negative components that are a¤ected by prices p and p, we nd
that constraint BCh0 (!) is feasible if wages are such that n
0
! (
0
!  
0
!0)+n

!

! >
n
0
! px
h0 + n! px
h + n! p("+ c(g!)=n!)+ n
0
! pe
0 :
Using the fact that prices belong to the simplex and the fact that " and
c(g!)=n! are independent vectors with positive coordinates, wages must sat-
isfy the following stricter inequality: n
0
! (
0
!   
0
!0) + n

!

! > n
0
! maxl x
h0
l +
n!maxl x
h
l + n!(" +maxl cl(g!)=n!)+ n
0
! maxl e
0
l : Now, since p belongs to the
simplex, p(xh0 + c(g!0)=n!0)  0!0 + pe
0
implies xh0l  
0
!0 + maxl e
0
l , for any
good l: The same is true for a type  consumer, that is, xhl  ! +maxl el , for
any good l: Then, n
0
! (
0
!  
0
!0)+n

!

! > n
0
! (
0
!0+maxl e
0
l )+n

!(

!+maxl e

l )+
n!("+maxl cl(g!)=n!)+ n
0
! maxl e
0
l : A bit of algebra shows that 
0
! (
0
!  
0
!0)+
!(

! !) 
0
!
0
!0 2
0
! maxl e
0
l  !maxl el  maxl cl(g!)=n! > ": For a type
 consumer, the analogous condition is 
0
! (
0
!   
0
!0)+ 

!(

!   !)   !!  
2!maxl e

l  
0
! maxl e
0
l  maxl cl(g!)=n! > ": Using 2maxf
0
! ; 

!gmaxl; el >
2!maxl e

l + 
0
! maxl e
0
l , we nd that the following condition is su¢ cient for a
consumer of any type (~ = ; 0) to increase his consumtion by " in state (x; ) :

0
! (
0
!   
0
!0) + 

!(

!   !)   maxf!!; 
0
!
0
!0g   2maxf
0
! ; 

!gmaxl;~ e~l 
maxl cl(g!)=n! > ": Let us denote this condition by (SC). Thus, the state
(x; ) is feasible under wages (!)=;0 and improves upon (x; ), contradicting
the assumption that a state composed only by homogeneous communities is in
the core. Hence, the core must be composed by heterogeneous communities.
In this economy equilibrium exists (guaranteed by Assumptions A1-A5 and
B1-B3) and is characterized by heterogeneous communities (Theorem 2 holds
since we assumed A6) if condition (SC) holds. We know that in equilibrium,


! = p(@y!(n

!; n
0
! )=@
), for  = ; 0, and 
0
!0 = p(@y!0(n
0
! )=@
0). Since every
jurisdiction industry produces only good, we can normalize the price of this good
to 1, and write 
0
!;!0  
0
!   
0
!0 = (@y!(n

!; n
0
! )=@
0)  (@y!(n!; n
0
! )=@
0)
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and !;!  !   ! = (@y!(n!; n
0
! )=@
)  (@y!0(n0! )=@). Then, a su¢ -
cient condition for both types of consumers to increase their consumtion by
" in state (x; ) is 
0
!
0
!;!0 + 

!

!;!   max(~;~!)=(;!);(0;!0) 
~
!(@y~!(n
~
~!)=@
~)  
2maxf0! ; !gmaxl; el  maxl cl(g!)=n! > ": 
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